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WOOD, ETC. v. SKENE
enforcement power against foreign insurers, or because at
best its remedies provide relief only as individual cases
arise and only within its own boundaries, rather than elim-
inating the objectionable practice at its root. In such in-
stances the FTC alone could provide effective nationwide
regulation and the ability to reach across state lines to
enforce its orders.
Common Law Copyright Of Architectural Plans*
Edgar H. Wood Ass'n, Inc. v. Skene1
Plaintiff, a practicing association of architects duly li-
censed under the laws of Massachusetts, was employed to
design and compile a complete set of working drawings2
and specifications3 for the erection of an apartment build-
ing. The contract stipulated that all property rights, title
and interest in the architectural drawings were to remain
in the plaintiff and were not to vest in the owner-client
upon completion of the structure. No statutory federal
copyright was secured for the plans or design by either the
plaintiff or the client. The architectural drawings were
filed with the municipal building department of Woburn
in order to obtain the necessary building permit. a pre-
requisite to the commencement of any construction proj-
ect.' A building permit was granted. Plaintiff's client,
Moylan, employed Portugal to supervise construction and
to see that it conformed with plaintiff's drawings and speci-
* This article is being entered in the Nathan Burkan Membrial Com-
petition.I1- Mass. -, 197 N.E. 2d 886 (1964).
2 BURKE, DALzELi. & TOWNSEND, ARCHITECTURAL AND BUILDING TRADES
DICTIONARY 342 (2nd ed. 1963). "WORKING DRAWING: In architecture, a
drawing or sketch which contains all dimensions and instructions necessary
for carrying a job through to a successful completion."
a Id. at 288. "SPECIFICATIONS: Written instructions to the builder con-
taining all the information pertaining to materials, style, workmanship,
fabrication, dimensions, colors, and finishes supplementary to that appear-
ing on the working drawings."
I Municipal building codes and ordinances vary in degree and scope
throughout the nation, therefore reference shall be made to two recom-
mended standard building code forms. NATIONAL BOARD OF FIRE UNDER-
vRITERS, NATIONAL 1BUILDING CODE § 102.1 (1955 ed.). "Permit required.
It shall be unlawful to construct, alter, remove or demlolish, or to commence
the construction . . . of a building or structure . . . without first filing
with the building official an 'application in writing and obtaining a formal
permit." Id. at § 102.6. "Plans to accompany application. Applications for
permits shall be accompanied by drawing of the proposed work, drawn to
scale .. " See BUILDING OFFICIALS CONFERENCE OF AMERICA, INC., BOCA
BASIC BUILDING CODE § 113.5 (3rd ed. 1960).
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fications. The defendant, Skene, desired to construct similar
structures and induced Portugal to enter his employment.
Portugal brought with him a complete set of plaintiff's
drawings. The architectural drawings were copied and a
new title box5 was attached thereto. These copies were
submitted to and approved by the Building Commission of
Norwood for the construction of defendant's buildings.'
Plaintiff brought this action to enjoin the defendant's
use of his drawings and/or for damages.7 The defendant's
demurrers having been sustained by the trial court, the
specific point raised on appeal was whether the plaintiff
had stated a sufficient cause of action to be heard in equity.
Specifically the issue was whether the plaintiff had been
divested of his common law copyright in his architectural
drawings when (1) the drawings were filed with a munici-
pal building department, or (2) the physical structures,
graphically described by the working drawings,8 were con-
structed. The court held that neither the filing nor con-
struction constituted a general publication which would
divest plaintiff of his common law copyright in his drawings.
Copyright law is designed to protect the author from
appropriation of his ideas,9 to allow the creator the benefit
of his own original intellectual product, 10 and "to combat
A title box will usually consist of the name of each specific drawing,
the date of the drawing's completion, the draftsman's initials and the
architectural office's name and address.
IEdgar H. Wood Ass'n v. Skene, - Mass. -, 197 N.E. 2d 886, 889(1964). "In sum, Wood's plans were copied and are being or were used to
construct in Norwood, buildings identical in design and specifications to the
Woburn buildings being erected."
In a common law copyright action an architect has two possible
remedies. He may enjoin the infringer from using the architect's drawings
and specifications, and from constructing the structure illusitrated and
described by them. However, this should only be granted when the defen-
dant-infringer has not substantially started clonstruction. If the infringer's
building is in the process of construction, or is completed, then the archi-
tect's remedy should be limited to the fair market value of his services
and drawings. This final figure usually would not include personal super-
vision fees, but should take into consideration the novelty, utility and
detail of the original design and drawings. Edgar H. Wood Ass'n v. Skene,
supra note 6, at 896.
1 The protection being sought by the architect was for his drawings and
specifications illustrating the structure, not for the completed structure.
9 Capital Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F. 2d 657, 662(2d Cir. 1955); Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 Fed. 321
(2d Cir. 1904); 'Kurfiss v. Cowherd, 233 Mo. App. 397, 121 S.W. 2d 282
(1938); Aronson v. Baker, 43 N.J. Eq. 365, 12 Atl. 177, 178-80 (1888);
Nathanielsz, Copyrights: Abandonment by Publication, 39 DiCTA 236 (1962).
10 Katz, Copyright Protection of Architectural Plans, Drawings, and
Designs, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 224, 228 (1954).
"Common law copyright is a negative sort of protection. It grants
nothing to the creator of intellectual property which he did not previ-
ously possess. Instead, it aids him in preserving inviolate his unpub-
lished work. In essence, the common law protects his right of secrecy,
his right to control the first publication of his work."
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the host of parasites who would feed gratuitously on his
creation."'1 The architect may be protected by one of two
forms of copyright,12 common law or statutory. 3 The fed-
eral statute has not preempted the common law, 4 in fact,
the statute separates the law into two distinct areas.
"Nothing in this title shall be construed to annul or
limit the right of the author or proprietor of an un-
published work, at common law or in equity, to prevent
the copying, publication, or use of such unpublished
work without his consent, and to obtain damages there-
fore."'"
11 Katz, supra note 10, at 225.
12 De Silva Constr. Corp. v. Herrald, 213 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Fla. 1962);
Edgar H. Wood Ass'n v. Skene, - Mass. -, 197 N.E. 2d 886, 889-90
(1964); Smith v. Paul, 174 Cal. App. 2d 744, 345 P. 2d 546, 77 A.L.R. 2d 1036
(1959); and Katz, supra note 10, at 225. "[T]he body of copyright law
is too small to cover the intellectual property field, it has . . . expanded in
other ways: It has grown two separate heads. One head is labeled common-
law copyright; the other, statutory copyright."
13 61 Stat. 652, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-32, 101-116, 201-216 (1958).
The architect's work is entitled to federal copyright by registration in one
of two classes which will permit the architect a wider scope of circulation
than is permitted under limited publication.
"The application for registration shall specify to which of the follow-
ing classes the work in which copyright is claimed belongs:
(g) Works of art; models or designs for works of art.
(i) Drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical
character." 61 Stat. 654, 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1958) ; See 17
U.S.C. Appendio §§ 202.10 and 202.12 (Supp. IV, 1958).
However, the clerical and administrative tasks which are involved in the
architect's Obtaining and maintaining federal copyright of his drawings
and/or designs are often enough to discourage his application for copy-
right. In addition, the architect is restricted to copyrighting his drawings,
since most designs cannot be classified as works of art.
The architect's protection for copyrighted drawings neither protects
against nor prohibits others from the construction of his graphically de-
scribed structures, Muller v. Triborough Bridge Auth., 43 F. Supp. 298
(S.D. N.Y. 1942), nor can the protection enjoin others from employing
the various arts and systems which the drawings explain, Baker v. Selden,
101 U.S. 99 (1879). The copyright protection will also be subjected to a
limited duration and "fair use" by others. For these reasons the architect,
who does not contemplate wide publication of his drawings, usually feels
that the acquisition of statutory copyright does not improve his position
materially.
14 Palmer v. DeWitt, 47 N.Y. 532, 536 (1872). "The common-law rights of
authors, as now recognized, existed before the passage of copyright laws,
and have not been taken away or impaired by those laws."; Werckmeisfter
v. American Lithographic Co., 134 Fed. 321 (2d Cir. 1904) ; Edgar H. Wood
Ass'n v. Skene, - Mass. -, 197 N.E. 2d at 889-90; and LATMAN, HowELL's
COPYRIGHT LAW 201 (4th rev. ed. 1962). The scope of this paper is limited
to common law copyright and is not intended to fully discuss the present
separate statutory remedy. However, it must be noted that a bill for the
general revision of the statutory copyright law has been introduced in
Congress. S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 1-54 (1964).
15 61 Stat. 654, 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1958).
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Prior to the first general publication of his literary
product, 6 an architect is entitled to complete common law
copyright protection. 7 This protection affords him the ex-
clusive right to offer his services and products to his clients,
to receive proper remuneration, and to license construction
from his working drawings." In order for the architect to
maintain this protection, he must remain the owner of his
products. Usually, in non-governmental projects, 9 the
property rights in the plans pass to the client when he ac-
cepts the architect's work and services and properly com-
pensates him for them." Thus in the absence of an express
contract term or conduct impliedly stipulating otherwise,
all copyright protection vests in the person commissioning
the project.2 To alleviate this problem the American In-
stitute of Architects recommends that all Owner-Architect
contracts contain a specific provision reserving in the archi-
tect all property rights, title, and interest in the archi-
tectural drawings.22
'16 Kurfiss v. Cowherd, 233 Mo. App. 397, 121 S.W. 2d 282, 286 (1938);
Palmer v. DeWitt, 47 N.Y. 532, 536 (1872) ; Katz, supra note 10, at 232.
"To be protected at common law, the unpublished original Work must
be expressed, in a concrete or tangible manner. This does not mean that
the author's thought must be set forth in some kind, of writing, and
that each premise must be completely developed. The requirement of
concreteness for intellectual productions Would appear to be satisfied
where the creator's thoughts are contained in such non-abstract form as
would permit the impress of his mark of ownership."
See Nathanielsz, a&upra note 9, at 236; 42 COLUM. L. REv. 290 (1942) ; and
75 U. PA. L. REv. 458 (1927).
17 Ketcham v. New York World's Fair 1939, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 657 (E.D.
N.Y. 1940), aff'd per curiam, 119 F. 2d 422 (2d Cir. 1941); Wright v.
Eisle, 86 App. Div. 356, 83 N.Y. Supp. 887 (1903) ; 18 C.J.S. Copyright § 136
(1939) ; TomsON, IT'S THE LAW! 221 (1960) ; 42 CoLUm. L. REv. 290 (1942);
59 MICIH. L. REv. 133 (1960) ; and 75 U. PA. L. REv. 458 (1927).
'8 TomSON, supra note 17, at 220-1; and 75 U. PA. L. Rv. 458 (1927).
In government contracts it is normal procedure for the government to
contract for all property rights, title and interest in the drawings.
20 cCoy v. Grant, 144 Minn. 92, 174 N.W. 728 (1919) ; AmERICAN INSTI-
TUTE OF ARCHITECTS, ARCHITECT'S HANDBOOK OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE,
Ch. 9, p. 6 (1963 ed.) ; and TOMSON, supra note 17, at 220, 225.
"1Tumey v. Little, 18 Misc. 2d 462, 186 N.Y.S. 2d 94, 95 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
Co. 1959); Kurfiss v. Cowherd, 233 Mo. App. 397, 121 S.W. 2d 282, 287
(1938); NImmEB, COPYRIGHT § 63 (1963); and TOMSON, supra note 17,
at 220-1. "In such case ... the owner is entitled to them. They become his
property, and the architect cannot subsequently prevent the owner from
using them in constructing another building. Nbr does he have a right to
receive additional compensation when they are used again ......
22 AIA Documents, The Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner
and Architect, Forms B131, B211, and B311 (1963),
"Ownership of Documents. Drawings and Specifications as instru-
ments of service are the property of the Architect whether the Project
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Assuming that the architect has succeeded in preserving
full ownership in his drawings, his rights are protected
by his common law copyright. This copyright protec-
tion extends to the moment there is a first general, as
opposed to limited, publication of his work. However, once
there has been such a general publication, the architect
loses his common law copyright, and his work becomes part
of the public domain.23 The line separating a general pub-
lication from a limited one is thin and often difficult to
draw. The intent of the architect,24 the subject matter, the
manner and extent of circulation, the opportunities avail-
able for others to copy the work, the communication and
exhibition of the literary property, and the nature of the
remedy of protection being sought are all contributing
factors in determining the nature of publication.25 General
publication exists when the author gives his thoughts, ideas,
sentiments, knowledge and/or information to the world by
unrestricted sale, dissemination, or exhibition.2  General
publication, however, is not dependent solely upon actual
sale of the literary property nor is it dependent upon any
act of the public. Generally when an author makes his
literary product available to the public, to all persons who
might be interested, he goes beyond limited publication. 8
for which they are made be executed or not. They are not to be used
on other projedts except by agreement in writing."
The AIA has incorporated a similar clause in the "General Conditions",
AIA Document, The General Conditions of the Contract for the Construc-
tion of Buildings, Form #A201 (1963),
"Art. 7. Ownership of Drawings. All Drawings, Specifications and
copies thereof furnished by the Architect are his property. They are
not to be used on other work, and, with the exception of the signed
Contract set, are to be returned to him on request, at the completion
of the work."
They have also recommended that some restrictive notice appear on all
architectural products. AMERICAN INsTITUTE OF ARcITECTS, supra note 20,
at 6.2 2
.Kurfiss v. Cowherd, 233 Mo. App. 397, 121 S.W. 2d 282, 286 (1938);
I LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY
§ 4 (1938) ; and ToMSON, supra note 17, at 222.
1Although the intent of the architect must be considered, this can only
be determined objectively by an examination of his actions. Kurfiss v.
Cowherd, supra note 23, at 287; TOMSON, supra note 17, at 224; and 59
MicH. L. REV. 133 (1960).
22Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 Fed. 321, 326 (2d
Cir. 1904) ; See Burciaga, Divestative Publication - Two-Century Dilemma,
12 Copy. L. SYM. (ASCAP) 201 (1963).
2" Kurfiss v. Cowherd, supra note 24, at 286; WITTENaERG, THE LAW OF
LITERARY POPERTY 61 (1957); 2 LADAS, supra note 23, § 321; 18 C.J.S.
Copyright and Literary Property § 13 (1939) ; and 59 MIcH. L. REV. 133
(1960).
17 Jewelers' Mercantile Agency v. Jewelers' Weekly Publication Co., 155
N.Y. 241, 49 N.E. 872, 875 (1898) ; and 18 C.J.S. upra note 26.
21 White v. Kimmel, 193 F. 2d 744 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
957 (1952) ; and Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 Fed. 321
(2d Cir. 1904).
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It is of little or no consequence that the number of en-
trusted persons is limited; it is sufficient that he has put it
within their reach.29 In analyzing whether the publication
is limited, and, therefore, non-divestive, all of the inter-
relating factors contributing to general publication must be
considered. However the most important factors to be con-
sidered are whether or not the free use of the subject mat-
ter of copyright is limited by expressed or implied condi-
tions which preclude its dedication to the public,3" and
whether or not the architect has any realistic control over
his actions.3 1
In the case of Werckmeister v. American Lithographic
Co., " defendant contended that public exhibition of an
artist's original painting, without notice of restrictions, on
its face divested the artist of common law copyright be-
cause of disclosure to the public. The court held that those
persons who saw the exhibition were sufficiently governed
by museum restrictions, forbidding photographing or re-
producing the compositions, so that only a limited publica-
tion occurred.33 Without such restrictions the court prob-
ably would have reached the opposite conclusion. There-
fore, in order to maintain a limited publication, the archi-
tectural designs, drawings, specifications and copies thereof,
are and should be distributed only among participating and
"interested" parties;34 and then only with a proper notice
of restrictions of use and ownership attached. 5
Such actions will, probably, not only prevent loss of
copyright by general publication but will, in addition, pre-
vent loss of copyright by abandonment. Abandonment is
claimed not to be a form of general publication. In DeSilva
29 Jewelers' Mercantile Agency v. Jewelers' Weekly Publication Co., 155
N.Y. 241, 49 N.E. 872, 875 (1898).
30 Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 Fed. 321, 324 (2d Cir.
1904) ; 18 C.3.S. supra note 26; LATMAN, supra note 14, at 64-5. "Distribu-
tion with limitation by the proprietor of the persons to whom the work is
communicated or of the purpose of 'the disclosure, is known as "limited,"
"restricted" or "private" publication, but is, more accurately, no publica-
tion at all." TomsoN, supra note 17, at 222; -and Bertz, Protecting Artistic
Property with the Equitable Servitude Doctrine, 46 MARQ. L. REv. 430, 445
(1963). As long as the architect maintains reasonable control over the
possession ,and distribution of the architectural drawings and specifications
to authorized persons, with proper notification of ownership, then obtaining
possession without authority makes such person liable to the architect.
31 United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 15 F.R.D. 224, 234-35 (S.D.
Cal. 1954) ; and Smith v. Paul, 174 Cal. App. 2d 744, 345 P. 2d 546, 550
(1959).
11 134 Fed. 321 (2d Cir. 1904).
83 Id. at 325.
34 "Interested" parties will normally be the general contractor and sub-
contractors, the owner-client and subdivisions within their organization,
and finally the architect's office which includes the corresponding engineers.
"I See footnote 22 and corresponding text.
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Const. Corp. v. Herrald,6 the court held that an intention
to abandon and therefore a loss of copyright will exist
when, without proper notice of restriction, (1) there is cir-
culation of architectural drawings amongst subcontractors;
and (2) there is a public exhibition of the physical struc-
ture as a model; and (3) advertisements and photographs of
the structure and plans are freely circulated. The court did
not say that such acts constituted a general publication of
the architectural drawings. Rather they said that such acts
showed a positive intent to abandon the copyright even
though such actions might not be sufficient to constitute a
general publication. In the Skene case there was not suffi-
cient evidence to warrant consideration of abandonment,
and most other cases have turned on a determination of
general or limited publication. However, this relatively
new theory of abandonment, as applied to architects, might
have extensive application in future cases where a court
is unable to find a general publication, yet in their discre-
tion they still feel that the particular architect is not en-
titled to his common law copyright.
Is the architect's public filing of his professional product
of such a nature that it (1) is tantamount to general publi-
cation, or (2) shows his intent to abandon common law
copyright protection? There are two distinct types of
public filing. The first is that which is required to obtain
a federal copyright. The filing in this instance is considered
a general publication,3 and the architect is voluntarily giv-
ing up one form of protection for another. Such filing
should not be equated with the second type of public filing,
the architect's submission of his drawings to the proper
municipal office to secure a building permit. In the latter
instance no new form of protection is being offered the
author, and such filing should not be considered, in itself,
a general publication.
Only a limited number of cases have been decided on
whether or not the submission of architectural drawings
to municipal building departments is a general publication.
The two leading cases supporting the view that such filing
divests the architect of his common law copyright were
both decided in New York. In Wright v. Eisle,38 the plain-
tiff had prepared working drawings and specifications for
the construction of a residence and filed them with the
building department of Mt. Vernon, New York. The de-
213 F. Supp. 184, 197 (M.D. Fla. 1962).
'7 Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 656-58 (1888) ; and O'Neill v. General
Film Co., 177 App. Div. 854, 157 N.Y. Supp. 1028, 1038 (1916).8s86 App. Div. 356, 83 N.Y. Supp. 887 (1903).
19641
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fendant, after seeing the constructed residence, hired a
second architect who designed a home substantially con-
forming to the original. The plaintiff sued for the value of
his services and drawings. The court, in a rather brief
opinion, stated:
"The act of publication is the act of the author...,
and; when the latter has permitted the work to be filed
in a public office as a step in furnishing the basis
on which he is to receive compensation from his work,
we are of the opinion that . . . the plaintiff has pub-
lished his work to the world, and can have no exclusive
right in the design, or its reproduction."39
The rule of the Wright case was followed in Tumey v.
Little" and DeSilva Constr. Corp. v. Herrald.4 In the
DeSilva case, the only federal decision on point, the court,
in dicta, said "that the filing of architectural plans in a
public office, even though it is required by statute or ordi-
nance, is tantamount to publication of said plans and
amounts to a dedication to the public .... ,42 The court
stated that its decision was based upon what appeared to
be the prevailing view. Apparently the prevailing view
consisted of the two New York decisions and three other
cases43 which were not directly in point. In California the
case of Smith v. Paul4 4 adopted the contrary position. Since
the two most recent cases on point, Smith and Skene, have
both decided that filing to secure a building permit is not
11 Id. at 889.
0 18 Misc. 2d 462, 186 N.Y.S. 2d 94 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 1959). The
plaintiff had prepared drawings of a residence for the defendant and was
properly compensated. Plaintiff contended that the defendant turned the
plans over to a third party who constructed similar residences. "[T]he
filing of an architect's plans with the building department constitutes a
publication terminating such common law copyright as he may have
had...." Id. at 95.
41213 F. ,Supp. 184 (M.D. Fla. 1962) ; See also NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 26
(1963); and 18 C.J.S. § 13 (1939), "Where not otherwise provided by
statute, deposit of plans and specifications in a public office ... is regarded
as a publication of them, and the exclusive right of control is thereafter
gone."
11 213 F. Supp. 184, 194 (M.D. Fla. 1962). (Emphasis added). The court
implied in their decision that if the architect wants to avoid a general
publication in filing, he should obtain a statutory copyright, and put proper
notice of such on each set of filed drawings.
11 Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617 (1888) ; Kurfiss v. Cowherd, 223 Mo.
App. 397, 121 S.W. 2d 282 (1938) ; and Gendell v. Orr, 13 Phila. 191 (Pa.
Common Pleas 1879).
1' 174 Cal. App. 2d 744, 345 P. 2d 546 (1959). Plaintiff, an unlicensed
architect, compiled plans and specifications for a home for Carr. The
plaintiff was to retain ownership of the drawings. The defendant copied
said plans and was in the process of constructing a home from them when
suit was begun.
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a general publication, the New York position can no longer
be considered a prevailing view. In fact, the case law is so
meagre and divided that courts faced with the problem in
the future will be free to analyze the problem substantially
unrestricted by precedent.
In analyzing and determining the effect of publicly
filing architectural plans the courts should give con-
sideration to the public policy embodied in the building
codes which require such filing. Such an analysis will dis-
close that architectural drawings are filed in order to give
the building commission graphic illustrations of all pro-
posed structures. These illustrations allow the commis-
sioner to check carefully and determine if the prime pur-
pose of the building code,45 public safety, is satisfied. The
Smith and Skene decisions employed such an analysis and
in reaching their conclusion stated that plans are filed by
compulsion of law to assure that the public will have ade-
quate protection from unsafe construction.46 The filing re-
quirements were not intended to vest new rights with the
general public and give them possessory rights in the
architectural product.47 The architect files to obtain a build-
ing permit, a prerequisite for beginning construction. He
gets no new protection, benefit or compensation by filing;
he is not selling anything, and he certainly does not intend
to abandon common law copyright."
This analysis of the function of public filing of archi-
tect's plans led the Smith and Skene courts to the sound
conclusion that the filing of the drawings with the proper
municipal departments was a publication to a "single
entity" for a limited and specified purpose and therefore
45 NATIONAL BOARD Or FIRE UNDERWRITERS, NATIONAL BUILDING CODE
§ 100.2 (1955 ed.). "Purpose of Code. The purpose of this code is to pro-
vide for safety, health and public welfare through structural strength and
stability, . . . incident to the design, (and) construction . . . of buildings
and structures."
41Edgar H. Wood Ass'n v. Skene, - Mass. -, 197 N.E. 2d 886, 893
(1964) ; Smith v. Paul, 174 Cal. App. 2d 744, 345 P. 2d 546, 551 (1959);
and NIMmER, COPYRIGHT § 55 (1963).
7' Smith v. Paul, supra note 46, at 551.
11 Edgar H. Wood Ass'n v. Skene, - Mass. -, 197 N.E. 2d 886, 893-94
(1964) ; Smith v. Paul, supra note 46, at 550, "Actually the architect by the
requirement that his plans be filed in order to build is forced against his
desires and consent to lose his common law rights if it be held that he
,thereby 'publishes' his plans. . . . [Hie is placed in a position where he
could rarely sell more than one set of his plans."; 2 LADAS, supra note 23,
at § 321: Katz, supra note 10, at 233 n. 54;
"If the filing of plans, drawings, and designs in governmental
officeis . . . is held to throw these technical writings into the public
domain, the architect is literally forced to divest himself of his exclu-
sive property, contrary to his own desires. He cannot build unless hefiles; the moment he files he loses his common law rights."
1964]
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was a non-divesting limited publication.49 It is conceded by
these courts that the public has a right to inspect, and if
necessary, to copy the filed plans, but only for the limited
purposes which "reasonably related to the objectives be-
hind the filing requirement.... That right does not extend
to making copies which will impair the architect's common
law copyright and property in the plans."5
The last point for consideration is whether or not the
completion of the building is (1) a general publication or
(2) an abandonment of copyright protection of the orig-
inal or as-built architectural drawings. The leading modern
case holding that completion of the structure is divestment
of copyright is Kurfiss v. Cowherd.51 The court stated that
any time the structure is used as a model "open for public
inspection" without restrictions on the viewer, the owner
of the common law copyright in the architectural drawings
will be divested of all future rights and the drawings be-
come part of the public domain.52 The court reasoned that,
since the public was free to take measurements of the
structure, they should not be prevented from using the orig-
inal or as-built drawings. The implications of this decision
might well be that any time the public can view or photo-
graph the completed building from several directions there
is a sufficient basis to find a general publication of the
drawings. Other reasons advanced for holding that erec-
tion divests the architect of his copyright are based on the
idea that otherwise the architect would in essence have a
perpetual monopoly in his designs and this would "remove
a majority of structures from the public domain." 53 The
basic fallacy in this latter argument is that copyright pro-
tection does not embrace the general design, interior or
exterior, of the building, and unless the copies are aided by
"1 Edgar H. Wood Ass'n v. Skene, supra note 48, at 893; and Katz, supra
note 10, at 235.
'0 Edgar H. Wood Ass'n v. Skene, supra note 48, at 894.
5"233 Mo. App. 397, 121 S.W. 2d 282 (1938). This case cited the first
American case on point, Gendell v. Orr, 13 Phila. 191 (Pa. Common Pleas
1S79), for its holding that if part of a completed structure is exposed to
public gaze this constitutes a general publication of the structure so exposed.
1
2
,Kurfiss v. Cowherd, 233 Mo. App. 397, 121 S.W. 2d, 282, 288 (1938).
"We think this unrestricted exhibition of the house was a publica-
tion. It is said that it was not intended that the public could or would
take measurements thereof; but the fact remains that there were no
restrictions to keep anyone from so doing, nor is it claimed that any
effort was made to prevent it. It is not a question of whether measure-
ments were so made, it is a question of whether the exhibition was
public to all the world and unrestricted."
5" 73 HARV. L. REv. 1391, 1392 (1960) ; 34 ST. JonN's L. REv. 326 (1959).
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the original or as-built drawings, or are in violation of a
use restriction, there is no infringement in the first place.54
The leading case of Tabor v. Hoffman55 stated the pre-
vailing view that an erection of a structure does not amount
to general publication of the plans. Although the Tabor
case was concerned with an engineering problem, it was
properly adapted to architectural problems and followed
in the Smith and Skene decisions.56 A similar conclusion
was reached in the De Silva case.5" The rationale of these
decisions is simply that it is virtually impossible for even
a professional draftsman to make a near duplicate of the
architectural drawings from mere site inspection of the
completed structure.58
The completion of the building is not, in itself, a basis
for a determination of abandonment. Since erection, ac-
cording to the prevailing rule, is not a general publication
divesting the architect of his copyright, it would be incon-
sistent to imply from this same act that the architect in-
tended to abandon this protection. Furthermore the com-
pletion of the structure is merely the consummation of the
building project and is not a manifestation of the archi-
tect's intent to relinquish his copyright. Although De Silva
considered "publication" of the completed structure to be
one of several contributing factors in a finding of abandon-
ment, this factor, alone, is of little probative value.
' Smith v. Paul, 174 Cal. App. 2d 744, 345 P. 2d 546, 550, 553-55 (1959);
Edgar H. Wood Ass'n v. Skene, - Mass. -, 197 N.E. 2d 886, 895 (1964).
"Observation or measurement of the exterior and the interior of a
completed building can hardly be said to approach an accurate copy
of a set of plans. We do not suggest that a common law copyright in
the plans is infringed by a drawing made from observation of the
interior or exterior of the buildings."
55 118 N.Y. 30, 23 N.E. 12, 13 (1889). "The precise question... is whether
there is a secret in ithe patterns that yet remains a secret, although the
pump has been given to the world." The question as it was posed, and the
answer, can easily be seen to equally apply to architectural drawings and
the erected structures. 'While the defendant could lawfully copy the pump,
because It had been published to the world, he could not lawfully copy the
patterns, because they had not been published, but were still, in every sense,
the property of the plaintiff .... " Id. at 13.
rG Katz, supra note 10, at 236. "A structure is the result of plans, not a
copy of them. . . . [B]uilding a structure ...cannot be a publication of
its plans."; Edgar H. Wood Ass'n v. Skene, - Mass. -, 197 N.E. 2d 886,
895 (1964) ; and Smith v. Paul, 174 Oal. App. 2d 744, 345 P. 2d 546, 550,
553-54 (1959).
", 213 F. Supp. 184, 196 (M.D. Fla. 1962). The court reached this con-
clusion because of their ruling "that the building of a structure from copy-
righted architectural plans is not an infringement of the architectural
plans themselves .... "
5' NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 57.3 (1963). A building cannot be called a deriva-
tive work solely because it is a product of architectural plans. The reason
being that mere inspection of the building will not permit a precise reproduc-
tion of the architectural drawings upon which the building is based.
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Therefore, properly considered, neither public filing of
archiectural plans nor completion of the structure should
constitute a loss of common law copyright protection.
MICHAEL S. SIMON
"Insanity" At Time Of Trial
Rowe v. State'
Defendant pleaded not guilty to a charge of murder.
He later added a special plea that he was insane at the
time of the commission of the act (insane then). On the
day of the trial, he filed an additional plea that he was
insane at the time of trial (insane now). The jury found
that the defendant was sane "then" and insane "now" and
returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the "second
degree."
The Maryland Court of Appeals, in a four to three de-
cision,' held that the trial court should not have received
the verdict on the issue of guilt or innocence when the jury
had also found that the defendant was insane at the time
of trial. The court, however, went on to sustain the trial
court's instructions that the jury should apply the same
test (the M'Naghten test) with respect to the pleas of in-
sanity "then" and insanity "now", that test being whether
the defendant had sufficient capacity and reason to enable
him to distinguish right from wrong and to understand the
nature and consequences of his act. By accepting this in-
struction, the Maryland court has established a test for in-
sanity at the time of trial contrary to logic and to the
weight of authority.
Most states have codified the common-law rule that an
accused person cannot be tried while "insane ' 3 or suffer-
ing from "insanity. ' 4 Some statutes do not use the word
1234 Md. 295, 199 A. 2d 785 (1964).
2The decision was delivered after reargument. Judge Horney wrote the
opinion for the majority. Judge Henderson delivered the dissenting opinion
in which Chief Judge Brune and Judge Hammond concurred.
a E.g., MD. CODE AN. art. 59, § 7 (1957) ; IDAHo CODE § 19-3301 (1947);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 2945.37 (Page 1953) ; TEXAs ANN. PENAL
CODE tit. 1, art. 34.39 (Vernon 1952).
'MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61.026 (1964) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4803(1948). Cf. REV. CODE WASH. ANN. § 10.76.020 (1961), which allows a plea
of insanity at the time of trial only if accompanied by a plea of insanity or
mental irresponsibility at the time of the commission of the crime.
The procedure for determining defendant's capacity to stand trial varies
with the jurisdiction. Among these diverse statutory procedures are pro-
visions adopting the common-law approach by which the trial judge has
